The Great Sea Battle : The Game of Battleship - Experience the Thrill and Excitement of Naval Warfar

Prizes of War Captured, sold or abandoned and confiscated: French and Russian battleships and cruisers steam under the British and German flags. With 23 new scenarios and 80 silky-smooth, die-cut playing pieces, this book requires Jutland (and only Jutland).

If you have followed the above rules for a few games in a row against the same opponent, break them to confuse your opponent. It's a great way to throw experienced opponents off their game...until they figure out what you're doing.

The Great Sea Battle : The Game of Battleship

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The Battle of Jutland (31 May - 1 June 1916) was the largest naval battle of the First World War. It was the only time that the British and German fleets of 'dreadnought' battleships actually came to blows.

The first glimmer of broad tactical sense appearing in the British fighting instructions is found in those of the Duke of York; to wit: "None . . . . shall pursue any small number of enemy ships before the main body of the enemy shall be disabled or shall run." It is true that breaking the line came into favor for a time, but only for the purpose of getting the wind (when to leeward) of at least a part of the hostile fleet. Doubling was also recognized as advisable when superior in numbers to the enemy. The essence of the principle of concentrating on a part of the enemy was not, however, understood in the early days. Rigid adherence to formation was considered of first importance. This latter doctrine was based upon the disadvantages which had resulted previously from insufficiently regular formation, but, being inherently a defensive idea, it led to the undue preponderance of defensive impulses, which, added to the weakness of the offensive weapons, invariably caused indecisive battles. It is only fair to say, however, that the advantage of concentrating the major portion of a fleet against an enemy fraction was considered, and by some was advocated, though it was not recognized as a basic principle. The difficulties of maneuver, the short range, and the limited area of train of the gun in those days would have made concentration of the Nelson style difficult to execute without bringing about great confusion. The known disadvantages of confusion led to an effort to crowd the enemy into confusion rather than to crush him in detail through concentration.

The century before Nelson was a period of slow development in which many tactical principles came to be recognized in theory, but except by accident were rarely applied practically. The genius of Nelson is responsible for a great acceleration in the progress of the art. He had the wisdom and the courage to shake off the fetters of tradition, to discard the column fetish and apply those almost untried principles which, though apparently sound, had never before received due consideration in the preparation of plans for battle. He seemed to understand that what mattered was the substance and not the form; that formation was a means and not an end. Empirical rules, in his keen insight, were to be followed only when applicable.

Admiration for Nelson's tactical genius, however, should not dim recognition for his work in developing the complementary art of command. The two are inseparable in contributing to success. Attention is invited, in passing, to the manifestly close relation between command and practical tactics on the field of battle; that is, to the fact that only by the proper development and utilization of the art of command is it possible to apply tactical principles to meet the innumerable and momentary exigencies that arise during every phase of action. Perhaps if the commander-in-chief could take station in an air machine hundreds of feet above the scene, so as to get an accurate idea of the relative positions of the forces at all times and could have rapid and thoroughly reliable communication with each individual ship of his engaged fleet, the urgent necessities for detailed conduct of battle chiefly through the trained intelligence of the various subordinate commanders would be minimized. But until this is possible great success can come only by means of subordinates who are not only conversant with the letter of the principles but who are also thoroughly familiarized with every aspect of them under a great variety of conditions. Not in any sense whatever is the rule of thumb a short cut to tactical success, and the due importance of properly applied principles of command in assuring decisive victory is not generally so well understood as could be wished for.

In applying the principles of tactics to the present day, we find, that even since Tsushima there have been very great changes in types of ships, in numbers that will probably be engaged, in weapons and in auxiliary appliances. The dreadnought type of battleship, the battle cruiser, the submarine, the sea-going destroyer, the long range torpedo, the floating mine, the radio apparatus, the perfected turret appliances, fire-control apparatus, gun sights, the turbine, the hydroplane, etc.

Consideration of our subject is simplified if accidental types are eliminated and only the pure types dealt in. These latter may be assumed to be: the battleship, the destroyer, the scout and the submarine.

Assuming then that each fleet commander will aim to get in a destroyer attack in force on the night preceding an action, information of the enemy main body at a time when the fleets are close enough to support such attack by battleships the next day, becomes of great importance. Since the best defence against such an attack is a similar attack on the opposing main body, information of our own main body is of equal importance to the enemy whether or not he be acting defensively.

During the daylight preceding a destroyer attack, both sides will try to drive in the opposing destroyers. Scouts and destroyers will be employed for this purpose, and these should be supported by fast battleships. The latter should in turn be supported by submarines, which are also of use in penetrating enemy screens and obtaining information of his main body, even after the surface scouting force be driven off.

Once having passed through the stratego-tactical period and having gotten the two fleets into sight contact by day, the functions of the various types change materially. The annihilation of the hostile fleet becomes the principal objective. The battleships' chief role is of course obvious. The gun being the main weapon of the battleship, the latter type will naturally form in a line of bearing about at right angles to the general bearing of the enemy. The types whose chief weapon is the torpedo, i. e., the destroyers and the submarines, will naturally seek a position on the bow of the enemy's formation. The water in advance of the two fleets will thus become the battleground of destroyers supported by such fast and powerful types as may be available. Scouts and fast battleships will be formed there in order to control this speed area and to project from there torpedo attacks on the hostile column, as well as to protect own battleship column head from similar attacks. It should be the aim to deliver these torpedo attacks after the main fleets have joined action, so as to force either a decided change of course of enemy fleet under gun-fire, or an acceptance by him of the risk of torpedo damage, accompanied in either case by a diminution of fire against friendly battleships, due to enemy change of course or change of target.

The faster fleet will draw ahead, isolating the rear of the slow fleet and enveloping its head, unless the slow fleet turns away and moves on an inner circle. With submarines present they must have high surface speed if they are to be of use to a fast fleet in turning enemy head. The slow fleet on the other hand may protect its head with slower submarines moving on interior lines. The slow submarines of a fast fleet may, however, attack through its own column in safety and deliver a torpedo attack on enemy center or rear of a long column. With the advent of the long-range torpedo this weapon will have a marked influence upon tactics. Fast battleships equipped with this torpedo may get within torpedo range at the expense of but slight gun-fire damage to themselves. The value of the submarine and the destroyer in day actions will be enormously increased; so that when this weapon comes into general use it may with reason be expected that the range at which guns will be used will be markedly increased, and in addition, the interval between ships must be increased if the chance of a torpedo which passes through the formation making a hit is to be discounted.

A torpedo hit early in the action is of so very much more value than one hitting after the damaged ship has already delivered a great part of her gun-fire, that it seems likely that effort will be made to inflict torpedo damage in the early action and before closing the range. Thus an intermediate step will be introduced between the "approach" and the deliberate general engagement at medium ranges. This may be termed the "torpedo" stage of the action and corresponds to the artillery stage ashore, and like artillery, the torpedo will be used to some extent during all stages of the battle.

Such plan must be firmly based on rudimentary tactical principles and should follow the lines along which indoctrination has previously followed. The battlefield is no place to introduce tactical novelties. United action is very difficult under the best conditions and impossible in battle except on terms entirely familiar to all the participants. In this connection it may be noted that one of the chief sources of a high morale is self-confidence which is born of familiarity with the task in hand, and this fact is one of the greatest arguments for previous training in games and fleet exercises. Doctrine, which is essential to the successful execution of any battle plan, cannot be otherwise established during peace coincidently with conviction of its soundness, and doctrine without general conviction is an empty form which will not survive the stress of battle. 2ff7e9595c